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#### Immigration reform will pass now but itll be close

Le 10/17 [Van, B.A. in Communications from Harvard University, Writer for America’s Voice, 2013, “When will Speaker Boehner Allow a Vote so Immigration Reform can Pass?” http://americasvoiceonline.org/blog/when-will-speaker-boehner-allow-a-vote-so-immigration-reform-can-pass/]

The thing is, if John Boehner wanted to, passing immigration reform through the House could be easy. During the fiscal negotiations of the last few weeks, he vowed he wouldn’t break the Hastert rule. It’s pretty clear that self-imposed excuse is no longer operable. Boehner vowed not to take up the Senate bill that re-opened the government and lifted the debt ceiling. The House ended up taking the Senate bill. As everyone is noting this morning, Boehner and the House GOP could have saved themselves a lot of time and trouble if they’d just done that for the start. The same can be true of passing immigration reform. The Speaker and his caucus are out of excuses. Any way you break it down, there exist enough votes to pass immigration reform with a path to citizenship through the House. Currently, there are 183 co-sponsors on the House immigration bill introduced two weeks ago. It is estimated that 200 Democrats could join with the 26 Republicans who are on the record supporting a path to citizenship, to ultimately pass such a bill. Today, in the wake of the fiscal votes, commentators are noting that at least 86 House Republicans have crossed the aisle to vote with Democrats on more than one occasion that Speaker Boehner has lifted the Hastert rule. That number is similar to the 84 House Republicans that the Weekly Standard recently identified as Congressmembers who support some form of legalization. A governing coalition of Democrats and moderate Republicans does exist. Speaker Boehner just needs to give them a vote. As for political timing–the only way this turns into another ugly political fight is if House Tea Partiers, led by Steve King, insist on making it so. As with the fiscal negotiations, immigration is another fight they will lose, whether it be this year, or the next, or the next. But the longer it takes, the more damage they’ll do to the GOP. Immigration reform is a broadly supported issue, backed by 88% of all Americans and an unprecedented coalition. Immigration reform swings elections and turns out massive rallies. The opposition is distracted and lacking support.

#### Obama is spending PC and it is key

Sink 10-15 – Staff writer for The Hill (Justin, “Obama to push immigration reform 'day after' budget deal, October 15 f 2013, <http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/328747-obama-to-push-immigration-reform-day-after-budget-deal-reached>

President Obama vowed Tuesday that he would pursue an immigration reform vote in the House the "day after" Congress reaches an agreement to reopen the government and raise the debt ceiling. "Once that’s done, you know, the day after — I’m going to be pushing to say, call a vote on immigration reform," Obama told Univision's Los Angeles affiliate. "And if I have to join with other advocates and continue to speak out on that, and keep pushing, I’m going to do so because I think it’s really important for the country. And now is the time to do it." The president reiterated his claim that the only thing holding back passage of the Senate's immigration bill is "Speaker Boehner not willing to call the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives." White House press secretary Jay Carney acknowledged Wednesday that the reform effort had been blown off course by the fiscal battles. "The president believes that one of the consequences of these manufactured crises is that time is taken away from the pursuit of other goals we have as a nation," Carney said. He argued that the legislation was "the opposite of a partisan pursuit" and passing a bill "would benefit both parties."

#### Plan drains political capital

LeoGrande, 12

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### Comprehensive immigration reform is key to the economy and highly skilled workers

Farrell 12/13/12 (Chris, a contributing editor for Bloomberg Businessweek. From 1986-97, he was on the magazine's staff, as a corporate finance staff and department editor and then as an economics editor. Farrell wrote Right on the Money: Taking Control of Your Personal Finances and Deflation: What Happens When Prices Fall? Among Farrell's many awards are a National Magazine Award, two Loeb Awards, and the Edward R. Murrow Award. Farrell is a graduate of the London School of Economics and Stanford University. “Obama’s Next Act: Immigration Reform” <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-12-13/obamas-next-act-immigration-reform>)

Washington won’t get much of a reprieve from verbal pyrotechnics once the drama of the fiscal cliff is over. Up next: major immigration reform. President Obama has made it clear that a comprehensive overhaul of the nation’s badly frayed immigration system is a second-term priority. Many Republican lawmakers are convinced the big takeaway from the 2012 election results is that conservatives need to rethink their hard-line stance on immigration—including illegal immigrants. Here’s what Washington should do before tackling the tough job of rewriting the immigration laws: Create a quicksilver path to citizenship for the 11 million to 12 million undocumented workers in the U.S. (excluding the small number convicted of violent crimes or multiple felonies). The shift in status acknowledges that these foreign-born newcomers, like previous generations of immigrants, overcame significant obstacles to come to the U.S. to make a better life for their families. Illegal immigrants are neighbors heading off to work, sending their kids to school, and attending church. Their everyday lives would vastly improve by moving from the shadows of society into the mainstream. More important from a public-policy perspective, the change would give a boost to the economy’s underlying dynamism. “What you’re doing in the short run is making it easier for workers to move between jobs, a relatively small effect,” says Gordon Hanson, a professor of economics at the University of California at San Diego. “The larger effect from eliminating uncertainty for these immigrants is creating incentives for them to make long-term investments in careers, entrepreneurship, education, homes, and community.” Let’s state the obvious: A rapid transformation of illegal immigrants into legal immigrants isn’t in the cards. Amnesty—let alone citizenship—is an anathema to large parts of the electorate. Too bad, since the scholarly evidence is compelling that immigrants—documented or not, legal or illegal—are a boon to the net economy. “Competition fosters economic growth,” says Michael Clemens, senior fellow at the Center for Global Development in Washington. The economic return from attracting skilled immigrants to the U.S. is well known. Foreign-born newcomers account for some 13 percent of the population, yet they are responsible for one-third of U.S. patented innovations. The nation’s high-tech regions such as Silicon Valley, the Silicon Hills of Austin, Tex., and Boston’s Route 128 rely on immigrant scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs, and employees. Better yet, economist Enrico Moretti at the University of California at Berkeley calculates that a 1 percent increase in the share of college-educated immigrants in a city hikes productivity and wages for others in the city. Less appreciated is how much the economy gains from the efforts of less-skilled immigrants, including illegal workers. Throughout the country, foreign-born newcomers have revived beaten-down neighborhoods as immigrant entrepreneurs have opened small businesses and immigrant families have put down stakes. Immigrant workers have played a vital role keeping a number of industries competitive, such as agriculture and meatpacking. Cities with lots of immigrants have seen their per capita tax base go up, according to David Card, an economist at UC Berkeley. Despite the popular impression that a rising tide of immigrants is associated with higher crime rates, research by Robert Sampson of Harvard University and others offer a compelling case that it’s no coincidence that the growing ranks of immigrants tracks the reduction in crime in the U.S. But don’t newcomers—legal and illegal—drive down wages and job opportunities for American workers? Not really. A cottage industry of economic studies doesn’t find any negative effect on native-born wages and employment on the local level. On the national level the research shows the impact on native-born Americans doesn’t drift far from zero, either positively or negatively. “In both cases, immigrants are more likely to complement the job prospects of U.S.-born citizens than they are to compete for the same jobs as U.S.-born citizens,” Giovanni Peri, an economist at the University of California at Davis, writes in Rationalizing U.S. Immigration Policy: Reforms for Simplicity, Fairness, and Economic Growth. The counterintuitive results reflect a numbers of factors. Immigrants expand the size of the economic pie by creating new businesses, new jobs, and new consumers. Middle-class families find it easier to focus on careers with affordable immigrant labor offering gardening, child care, and other services. Many illegal immigrants aren’t fluent in English, so they don’t compete for the same jobs as native-born workers. Another factor behind the lack of direct competition is the higher educational level of native-born Americans. In 1960 about half of U.S.-born working-age adults hadn’t completed high school, while the comparable figure today is about 8 percent. The real downside concern is on the fiscal side of the immigrant ledger. Yes, more taxes would go into Social Security, Medicare, and the like with legalization, but more people would qualify for Medicaid, welfare, and other benefits. At the local level, many school districts are strained financially from educating immigrant children, legal and illegal. That said, the prospect of fiscal costs would diminish as newly legalized immigrant workers move freely around the country seeking jobs, entrepreneurs are comfortable expanding their payrolls, and immigrant parents push their children to live the American Dream. “Over time, as entrepreneurs emerge and families are better able to get their kids through high school and college, you’re reducing the long-run fiscal claim of the group,” says Hanson. There is no economic evidence that making roughly 6 percent of the workforce illegal will benefit the economy. Plenty of research supports the opposite case. A fast track to legality offers Washington a rare twofer: a just move that’s economically efficient.

#### Economic decline risks multiple global nuclear wars

O’Hanlon 12 Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution, former Professor at the University of Michigan [“The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt,” Los Angeles Times, July 10th, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon>]

Alas, globalization and automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the American dream into question for the working classes. Another decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more likely because much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America — especially if it costs us well over half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses. Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purport 7ed decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrainedin throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely. When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing globalpoverty through development aid, **moving toward a world free of** nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a muchmore urgent big-pictureissue:restoring U.S. economic strength.Nothing else isreallypossibleif thatfundamental prerequisite toeffectiveforeign policyis not reestablished.

### 2

#### Obama is taking a hard line stance against Latin American countries now

Baverstock 5-17 - foreign correspondent based in Venezuela (Alasdair, “Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on Washington's recognition”, May 17 of 2013, CSM, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on-Washington-s-recognition>)

More than a month after Venezuela’s contested presidential election, President Nicolás Maduro’s narrow victory has yet to be recognized by the United States. Refusing to legitimize the new premier while a partial recount of the vote is underway, the US position has led to further political tensions in a relationship historically stressed under the leadership of former President Hugo Chávez. ¶ A handful of countries, including Chile, Peru, and the US, have expressed concern over the democratic standards of the election, which Maduro won by a little more than 1 percent of the vote. Venezuela’s opposition party is calling for the results to be annulled, citing over 3,000 instances of election fraud, ranging from alleged multiple-voting in chavista-strongholds to polling booth intimidation.¶ “Obviously, if there are huge irregularities we are going to have serious questions about the viability of that government,” said Secretary of State John Kerry during a hearing of the US Foreign Affairs Committee following the announcement of President Maduro’s victory in April.¶ While the US has pledged not to interfere with Venezuelan politics, the refusal to recognize Maduro's presidency has left many to question what message the US is trying to send, and how – if at all – it will impact Venezuela post-Chávez.¶ “[The US isn’t] recognizing or failing to recognize,” says David Smilde, professor of sociology at the University of Georgia. “They’re just waiting. But here in Venezuela that’s seen as an act of belligerence.”¶ 'Symbolic'¶ The US’s reluctance to accept the new leader affects little in economic terms; the heavy crude is still flowing steadily from the Venezuelan oil fields into US refineries, a trading relationship upon which Venezuela relies heavily, particularly following the recent slump in global oil prices. In fact, many believe the US’s reluctance to legitimize Maduro amounts to little more than a message to other regional observers. ¶ “Maduro is certainly now the president of Venezuela,” says Mark Jones, professor of political science at Rice University in Texas. “The US’s refusal to recognize him is more symbolic than anything else. Ignoring Maduro’s win sends a signal to other Latin American countries that these elections didn’t meet minimum democratic standards.”¶ Other observers cite the socialist leader’s continued belligerence toward Washington – Maduro blames the US government’s “dark forces” for the death of Mr. Chávez and has pursued the provocative rhetoric of his predecessor – as a factor in the US’s reluctance to recognize Maduro as president.

#### The plan appeases Cuba

**Poblete ’11** (Jason Poblete—attorney and expert on U.S. export control laws and regulations for military and dual-use items, economic sanctions, & free trade. FEBRUARY 25, 2011. http://jasonpoblete.com/2011/02/25/u-s-cuba-law-cherry-picking-makes-for-bad-pie/)

At Brookings last week, a panel of experts who support trade with the Cuban government waxed on about the powers that the President has under U.S. law to further ease sanctions on the regime. A report was presented by a lawyer that was paid for by a group that supports this approach toward Cuba. The panel was titled, ”U.S.-Cuba Relations: Moving Policy Forward in 2011 and Beyond.” When it comes to U.S.-Cuba policy, there is no shortage of opinion on this town as to what to do next. Statutes, laws, regulations, and policy statement can easily be cherry-picked to craft a master solution; but at the heart of the matter is a political decision that has nothing to do with law or policy. Contrary to what anti-Cuba embargo advocates argue, there is no robust economic sanctions program in force against the Cuban regime. There are many choices on the books to squeeze the Cuban government, but few of them are used to do so. Indeed, even under Republican administrations trade to Cuba has exponentially increased while the regime-targeting sanctions decreased or, as is the case for most, ever been used. The Cuban regime is full of bad seeds. There is no enlightened or Third Way of dealing with it. It has survived as long as it has because we keep feeding it with money from remittances and tourist travel. Yes, tourist travel. A majority of the people that visit Cuba may claim that it is for family visits. And undoubtedly some of it is. But the overwhelming majority of people visit to have fun and go sightseeing. My grandparents passed away last year and, until the end, they were proud that they never returned to Cuba and, as they would frequently say, “ni un centavo he mandado”. They never sent money or medicine to Cuba and would, at times, politely curse those who did. Harsh? Maybe. But those of us who never lived under Communism will never really know what it was like. “The President maintains broad authority and discretion to significantly ease specific provisions of the Cuba sanctions regime in support of particular U.S. foreign policy objectives,” concludes the report released at Brookings last week. Reasonable legal scholars can argue about this, but, this report fails to take into account that there are significant statutory requirements that have been ignored by Republican and Democratic Administrations that require sanctions tightening, no matter what. In the case of Cuba, legal cherry-picking has made for bad pie. It has been disproportionately done to favor easing sanctions, never truly increasing sanctions on the regime. At this juncture, it is not in the U.S. interest to ease sanctions anymore on the regime. There area some very serious issues on the table that need to be addressed, not the least of which are the billions owed by the regime to certified U.S. claimants whose properties and businesses were expropriated without compensation by Cuban thugs. Cuba’s cooperation with state sponsors of terrorism have correctly placed Cuba on the state sponsors of terror list, where it must remain. The regime steals U.S. military and commercial secrets, then sells them to other rogue regimes such as the Iranians. And the list goes on. Easing sanctions on the regime would be reckless and will not help the Cuban people. The current Cuban government has nothing of value to offer the U.S. but headaches. What we should be doing is encouraging new leaders to urge the dinosaurs to step aside and put in motion a process that empowers free people, and as required by statute, creates a transition government without Fidel Castro or Raul Castro. If the Obama Administration wants to help the Cuban people and the Cuban opposition, use some tough love. Enforce sanctions on the regime, as intended by the Congress and clearly laid out in statute. For folks who think that some of us on this side of the issue are not open to new approaches toward Cuba, they are sorely mistaken. Quite the opposite. In fact, some things that we need to do may raise some eyebrows in conservative circles. We need to do more to reach out to the true freedom seekers and it may require sacrifices along the way, but always keeping U.S. interests in mind, first and foremost. However, during the past few years, neither aim of U.S. law and policy has been successfully achieved: isolation of the Cuban regime, support for the Cuban people. Appeasing the regime with more and more trade and travel, as we have done for decades, is not a policy but a copt out to making the tough decisions that need to be made.

#### Appeasement kills credibility – it shows countries that the US isn’t hard line - playing a weak hand doesn’t work

Weissberg 10 - Professor of Political Science-Emeritus, University of Illinois-Urbana (Robert, “President Obama's Compulsive Appeasement Disorder”, August 27 of 2010, American Thinker, <http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/08/president_obamas_compulsive_ap.html>)

There's a simple explanation: we are no longer feared. Superpowers of yesteryear, going back to the Greeks and Romans, were feared for a reason -- they leveled a city to make an example. Today, by contrast, Uncle Sam relies on cajoling, bribery (think North Korea), entreating puny leaders of inchoate states (special envoys to the PLO's Mahmoud Abbas) and otherwise playing weak hands. We have gone from resolve to U.N. resolution. We've forgotten Machiavelli's sage advice: since love and fear can hardly exist together, if we must choose between them, it is far safer to be feared than loved.¶ Being feared does not require bombing Iran into the Stone Age, though that would certainly terrify North Korea and even slow down the Somali pirates. Being feared is when your enemy believes that you are willing to use overwhelming, deadly force, and this need not require nuking anybody. The trick is creating a credible, threatening persona -- convincing your enemy that while you may speak softly, you also carry a big stick and are willing to use it. Israel long ago learned this lesson, regardless of world outrage.

#### Obama’s strength is uniquely key to solve multiple conflicts

Ben Coes 11, a former speechwriter in the George H.W. Bush administration, managed Mitt Romney’s successful campaign for Massachusetts Governor in 2002 & author, “The disease of a weak president”, The Daily Caller, http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/30/the-disease-of-a-weak-president/

The disease of a weak president usually begins with the Achilles’ heel all politicians are born with — the desire to be popular. It leads to pandering to different audiences, people and countries and creates a sloppy, incoherent set of policies. Ironically, it ultimately results in that very politician losing the trust and respect of friends and foes alike.¶ In the case of Israel, those of us who are strong supporters can at least take comfort in the knowledge that Tel Aviv will do whatever is necessary to protect itself from potential threats from its unfriendly neighbors. While it would be preferable for the Israelis to be able to count on the United States, in both word and deed, the fact is right now they stand alone. Obama and his foreign policy team have undercut the Israelis in a multitude of ways. Despite this, I wouldn’t bet against the soldiers of Shin Bet, Shayetet 13 and the Israeli Defense Forces.¶ But Obama’s weakness could — in other places — have implications far, far worse than anything that might ultimately occur in Israel. The triangular plot of land that connects Pakistan, India and China is held together with much more fragility and is built upon a truly foreboding foundation of religious hatreds, radicalism, resource envy and nuclear weapons.¶ If you can only worry about preventing one foreign policy disaster, worry about this one.**¶** Here are a few unsettling facts to think about:¶ First, Pakistan and India have fought three wars since the British de-colonized and left the region in 1947. All three wars occurred before the two countries had nuclear weapons. Both countries now possess hundreds of nuclear weapons, enough to wipe each other off the map many times over.¶ Second, Pakistan is 97% Muslim. It is a question of when — not if — Pakistan elects a radical Islamist in the mold of Ayatollah Khomeini as its president. Make no mistake, it will happen, and when it does the world will have a far greater concern than Ali Khamenei or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and a single nuclear device.¶ Third, China sits at the northern border of both India and Pakistan. China is strategically aligned with Pakistan. Most concerning, China covets India’s natural resources. Over the years, it has slowly inched its way into the northern tier of India-controlled Kashmir Territory, appropriating land and resources and drawing little notice from the outside world.¶ In my book, Coup D’Etat, I consider this tinderbox of colliding forces in Pakistan, India and China as a thriller writer. But thriller writers have the luxury of solving problems by imagining solutions on the page. In my book, when Pakistan elects a radical Islamist who then starts a war with India and introduces nuclear weapons to the theater, America steps in and removes the Pakistani leader through a coup d’état.¶ I wish it was that simple.¶ The more complicated and difficult truth is that we, as Americans, must take sides. We must be willing to be unpopular in certain places. Most important, we must be ready and willing to threaten our military might on behalf of our allies. And our allies are Israel and India.¶ There are many threats out there — Islamic radicalism, Chinese technology espionage, global debt and half a dozen other things that smarter people than me are no doubt worrying about. But the single greatest threat to America is none of these. The single greatest threat facing America and our allies is a weak U.S. president. It doesn’t have to be this way. President Obama could — if he chose — develop a backbone and lead. Alternatively, America could elect a new president. It has to be one or the other. The status quo is simply not an option.

#### South China Sea conflicts cause extinction

Wittner 11 (Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York/Albany, Wittner is the author of eight books, the editor or co-editor of another four, and the author of over 250 published articles and book reviews. From 1984 to 1987, he edited Peace & Change, a journal of peace research., 11/28/2011, "Is a Nuclear War With China Possible?", www.huntingtonnews.net/14446)

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.

### 3

The United States federal government should

- ask the governments of Brazil and Mexico to diplomatically engage Cuba on its behalf to determine to remove

- inform Brazil and Mexico that it will abide by the results of negotiations

- implement any policy changes that negotiations between Brazil, Mexico, and Cuba recommend and

-establish an embassy in the Republic of Cuba

Solves the case and preserves US soft power

Iglesias 12 – Commander of the US Navy (Carlos, “United States Security Policy

Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba”, 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408~~)

Unlike the policy implications above, the major hurdle to this interest does not ¶ come from any continuation of the GOC, but from the rest of the world. International ¶ opposition to the perceived fairness and effectiveness of the economic sanctions has¶ long posed an obstacle for U.S. policy. In the global scale, the problem is epitomized by ¶ the twenty consecutive years of near unanimous UN General Assembly resolution votes ¶ against the embargo. 96 More regionally, Spain and other European Union partners have ¶ strongly pushed to loosen sanctions. The arguments are straightforward and pragmatic, ¶ “since sanctions in place have not worked, it makes more sense to do things that would ¶ work, and (the next obvious one is to) change things.”97 Even more locally, Cuba has ¶ managed to generally retain positive feelings among the people of Latin American in ¶ spite of the country’s domestic realities.98 The rise of Raúl and any subsequent ¶ successions further complicated the problem of mustering international consensus.¶ Several countries in the hemisphere see any new Cuban leadership as fresh opportunities to engage in common interests. The two largest Latin American countries, ¶ Brazil and Mexico, have both ascribed to this approach and have indicated their ¶ interests in forging new ties since Fidel’s stepped down.99¶ On the other hand, this international dissention does hold some prospect for ¶ leveraging U.S. soft power. An indirect approach would be to coordinate U.S. proxy ¶ actions with partner countries interested in Cuba. This has the double benefit of ¶ leveraging U.S. soft power without compromising legislated restrictions or provoking¶ hard-line Cuban-American ire. In this approach, burgeoning relations with Brazil and ¶ Mexico would be strong candidates. Devoid of the “bullhorn diplomacy” that have ¶ marginalized U.S.-Cuban policy efficacy for decades, the U.S. could better engage the ¶ island through hemispherical interlocutors. At a minimum, U.S. interests would be ¶ advanced through the proxy insights of what is occurring on the island in addition to the ¶ potential displacement of anti-American influences (e.g. Chávez).¶ 100Another potential gain for U.S. interests would be to upgrade its diplomatic ¶ presence on the island. For decades, the countries have reciprocated diplomacy ¶ marginalization with low-level “interest sections” in each other capitals. The fallback ¶ reasoning for the U.S. has always been that it did not want to appear to reward the ¶ GOC’s legitimacy with an embassy. This is myopic and inconsistent. The national ¶ strategy clearly promotes engagement in order to “learn about the intentions and nature ¶ of closed regimes, and to plainly demonstrate to the public within those nations that ¶ their governments are to blame for their isolations.¶ 101 Additionally, the diplomatic level is ¶ inconsistent with the longstanding U.S. accreditation of ambassadors to both friendly ¶ and hostile governments.102 An embassy in Cuba could support critical awareness and engagements. In the event of an opportunity or crisis, this presence could be the ¶ difference between knowing where, when, and with whom to act or just watching from ¶ across the Florida Straits.

### 4

#### “Engagement” requires increasing economic contacts in trade or financial transactions

Resnick 1 – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

Scholars have limited the concept of engagement in a third way by unnecessarily restricting the scope of the policy. In their evaluation of post-Cold War US engagement of China, Paul Papayoanou and Scott Kastner define engagement as the attempt to integrate a target country into the international order through promoting "increased trade and financial transactions."(n21) However, limiting engagement policy to the increasing of economic interdependence leaves out many other issue areas that were an integral part of the Clinton administration's China policy, including those in the diplomatic, military and cultural arenas. Similarly, the US engagement of North Korea, as epitomized by the 1994 Agreed Framework pact, promises eventual normalization of economic relations and the gradual normalization of diplomatic relations.(n22) Equating engagement with economic contacts alone risks neglecting the importance and potential effectiveness of contacts in noneconomic issue areas. Finally, some scholars risk gleaning only a partial and distorted insight into engagement by restrictively evaluating its effectiveness in achieving only some of its professed objectives. Papayoanou and Kastner deny that they seek merely to examine the "security implications" of the US engagement of China, though in a footnote, they admit that "[m]uch of the debate [over US policy toward the PRC] centers around the effects of engagement versus containment on human rights in China."(n23) This approach violates a cardinal tenet of statecraft analysis: the need to acknowledge multiple objectives in virtually all attempts to exercise inter-state influence.(n24) Absent a comprehensive survey of the multiplicity of goals involved in any such attempt, it would be naive to accept any verdict rendered concerning its overall merits. A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include: DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relationsPromotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa MILITARY CONTACTS Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versaArms transfers Military aid and cooperation Military exchange and training programs Confidence and security-building measures Intelligence sharing ECONOMIC CONTACTS Trade agreements and promotionForeign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants CULTURAL CONTACTS Cultural treatiesInauguration of travel and tourism links Sport, artistic and academic exchanges (n25) Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state. This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28) Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement. This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

#### The plan is appeasement – they are distinct

Times-Dispatch Staff 12 (Jan 22, “Cuba: Patsies,” <http://www.timesdispatch.com/news/cuba-patsies/article_5755996d-246f-5ca4-ada5-14b567a56603.html>, jkim)

The Obama administration's appeasement of the Castro regime in Cuba was meant to improve conditions there. Last January the White House eased travel restrictions. Near the end of the year it opened the door to a prisoner swap to exchange Bill Gross, an American falsely accused of spying, for Rene Gonzalez — who helped Cuba shoot down two civilian planes on a humanitarian mission in 1996.

Along the way the administration also offered to remove Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and to cut back efforts at promoting democracy in the island gulag, among other things.

Voting Issue –

Limits – their definition of engagement opens the floodgates for all affs that unilaterally act – destroys indepth education and clash

Ground – they will spike out of our disads that have engagement links – destroys predictability and fairness

### Terrorism

#### AFF doesn’t change Cuban overall terrorist policies

French, 09 – is the Director for the U.S.-Cuba Policy Initiative at the New America Foundation(Anya Landau, “Options for Engagement A Resource Guide for Reforming U.S. Policy toward Cuba” http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Cuba/USPolicy/options-for-engagement.pdf)

Section 6(j)(4) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 sets forth the procedure for removing a country from the State Department’s list of “state sponsors of terrorism.” At least 45 days before the President may remove a country from the list, he must report to Congress either: • That there has been “a change in leadership and policies” in such country, the government is not supporting acts of terrorism, and that such government has provided assurances that it will not do so; or • That such government has not “provided any support for international terrorism” in the previous six months and that such government has provided assurances that it will not do so in the future. If the Obama Administration were to conclude that there is no evidence to justify Cuba’s continued inclusion on the terrorism list, the Export Administration Act does not provide Congress the authority to block the move; nor does it give Congress authority to compel Cuba’s removal from the list. The process of removing Cuba from the terrorism list could hinge on a few key issues, such as asking for a firm Cuban government restatement of its position against terrorism and obtaining a clear commitment concerning anyone living on the island that has ever had ties to terrorist groups.

#### War turns structural violence and genocide

**PPU 07** (Peace Pledge Union, oldest pacifist organization of Britain. Genocide. June 16. <http://www.ppu.org.uk/genocide/index1a.html>)

These are horrors we want to protect children from, so why try to talk to them about it? It's a question of not hiding facts. Children must understand what human beings are capable of. This means understanding not only the great achievements of science, culture and society, but also how far, at times, human cruelty can go. Our children need to grow up determined to restrain and forestall that cruelty. So, from early on, they need to start learning how it works. How else can they be fully equipped to recognise the signs of evil, and resist it?  What is our approach? We have no hidden agenda. Our argument is plain and up-front: it's war that makes genocide possible. This is not only because genocide is committed under cover of war or during the conduct of it. The very acceptance of war as a legitimate practice of aggression (or, as it is sometimes called, defence) creates a mindset, a social climate, in which war can also be envisaged as a means of oppression and annihilation. We deliberately train and equip professional soldiers to wage war, and the spin-off is that we also equip callous, fanatic, cold-blooded, criminal, cunning, clever, brutish men, and a few women, to commit genocide. And they do. There are even those who get pleasure out of it.  So talking with our children about genocide means talking about things we all know, problems we all have to solve. Intolerance. Bullying. Violence. Prejudice. Hatred. Victimisation. Fanaticism and extremism. Hunger for power. Using weapons, physical and mental. Armed conflict and war can and do grow from any or all of these.  We also have to ask ourselves whether the laws we try to make for conducting war have, or ever could have, any real bite. Do human rights agreements have any real power to stop human rights abuses? Human rights abuses are no longer, if they ever were, the accidents of war: they are the tools of it. War is an essentially lawless state of affairs. We need to explain this to children.  What's more, as long as war is regarded as permissible, and prepared for, it will happen. Itsapparent 'successes' are all, without exception, short-term. Most lead onto failures (not all of them recorded). Every act of war carries the seeds of another: wars may end, in the messy and damaging way they do, but they don't end war. We need to explain this to children.  We need to tell them that war is not a necessary evil. If we take war out of the picture, we'll be able to discern the real anatomy of a dispute, and deal with its root causes in nonviolent ways. There will always be conflicts, the stuff of life, but without war people will be able to disagree in safety. And genocide will be a shame of the past.

#### Consequences matter – the tunnel vision of moral absolutism generates evil and political irrelevance

Issac, 2002 (Jeffery, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Dissent, Vol. 49 No. 2, Spring)

Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hannah Arendt have taught, **an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility**. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: **(1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intentions does not ensure the achievement of what one intends.** Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally comprised parties may seem like the right thing, but **if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters**; **(2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity** is not simply a form of powerlessness, it **is often a form of complicity in injustice.** This is why, from the standpoint of politics-as opposed to religion-pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and **(3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives** of action, **that is most significant**. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, **it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil.** **This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic** and historically contextualized **ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment.** It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. **And it undermines political effectiveness.**

#### Reps don’t come first and placing them first shatters real world change

Dewsbury ‘3 (John-David Dewsbury -- School of Geographical Studies, University of Bristol -- Environment and Planning A 2003, volume 35, pages 1907-1932 -- http://www.sages.unimelb.edu.au/news/mhgr/dewsbury.pdf)

That someone includes us -- the social scientists, the researchers, and the writers. In some way we are all false witnesses to what is there.(2) So, even though the philosophical drive moves against the apparently sterile setup of totalizing representations, the presentation of ideas is trapped within the structure it is trying to critique. In my opinion, this sterility is only apparent. Significantly, this appearance is valid from both sides: from the side of representational theory because of the belief in the representational structure as being able to give an account of everything; and from the side of nonrepresentational theory because of the danger of getting carried away with an absolute critique of representations. The apparent sterility comes from this last point: that in getting carried away with critique you fail to appreciate that the building blocks of representation are not sterile in themselves -- only when they are used as part of a system. The representational system, its structure and regulation of meaning, is not complete -- it needs constant maintenance, loyalty, and faith from those who practice it. In this regard, its power is in its pragmatic functions: easy communication of ideas (that restricts their potential extension), and sustainable, defensible, and consensual agreement on understanding (a certain kind of understanding, and hence a certain type of knowledge). The nonrepresentational argument comes into its own in asking us to revisit the performative space of representation in a manner that is more attuned to its fragile constitution. The point being that representation left critically unattended only allows for conceptual difference and not for a concept of difference as such. The former maintains existing ideological markers whilst the latter challenges us to invent new ones. For me, the project of nonrepresentational theory then, is to excavate the empty space between the lines of representational meaning in order to see what is also possible. The representational system is not wrong: rather, it is the belief that it offers complete understanding -- and that only it offers any sensible understanding at all -- that is critically flawed.

#### Empirics are sufficient backing of our impacts

Owen, 02 (David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### Pragmatic focus on experience outweighs a focus on ethics --- value emerges in experience, not the other way around

Parker, 96 – Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Grand Valley State University (Kelly A., “Pragmatism and Environmental Thought,” *Environmental Pragmatism*, 1996, ed: Light and Katz, p. 25-27)

While it is wrong to suggest that there is a "consensus metaphysics" among the pragmatists (and recognizing that "neo-pragmatists" such as Richard Rorty would maintain that it is a mistake to talk about metaphysics at all), we can identify some characteristic themes in pragmatic thought about the world. There is an irreducible pluralism in the world we encounter. There is the idea (supported by con- temporary physics) that indeterminacy and chance are real features of the world. Change, development, and novelty are everywhere the rule. The pragmatists also attend to certain common - perhaps even universal- structures and relations that appear throughout our experi- ence. Pragmatism, then, sees reality as process and development, and sees beings as relationally defined centers of meaning rather than as singular entities that simply stand alongside one another in the world. It emphasizes not substantial beings, but interrelations, connectedness, transactions and entanglements as constitutive of reality. All of this is based on **rigorous attention to what is actually there in experience,** and not on what this or that philosophy suggests we should find. This commitment to experience itself as the primary authority in speculative matters led James to call his philosophy "radical empiricism."10 Immanuel Kant provided the starting point for pragmatic metaphysics. The noumenal world, the world as it is in itself inde- pendent of the ordering categories of the mind, is by definition incapable of entering into knowledge or experience. To a pragmatist, the concept of a world, entity or property existing apart from the ordering influence of mind is strictly meaningless. To speak of the world at all is thus to speak of what Kant called the phenomenal world. To be real is to be capable of entering into experience; a thing's effects, its relations to other phenomena, are thus all there is to be known about the thing. The early pragmatists accordingly dropped talk of forms, essences and substances, and set about developing a new metaphysics born of experience. Their resulting views tend to cut across such standard philosophical dichotomies as "idealism vs. realism." **The pragmatists proposed reforms of epistemology and metaphysics that turn Enlightenment thought inside out.** The implications of pragmatic thought about value are no less revolutionary. The central emphases on experience, and on the experimental approach to establishing our knowledge and practices, make for a value theory that highlights the aesthetic dimension, sees ethics as a process of continual mediation of conflict in an ever-changing world and lays the groundwork for a social and political philosophy that **places democratic and humanitarian concerns at the center of social arrangements. All value emerges in experience**. The question of ethics - "What is good?" - ultimately brings us back to concrete questions about what is experienced as good in the interaction of the organism with its environment. The inquiry does not endwith the individual's affective experience, of course, but it recognizes this as the only possible birthplace of value. In determining the aesthetic significance of experience, pragmatists maintain a Jamesian radical empiricism: nothing is introduced that is not experienced, but due consideration must be afforded to all that is experienced. I I The first question about value, then, is not "What ought we to desire?" but "What do people in fact desire, and why?" The answers are many and complex, and are not fully reducible, for example, to the categories of a utilitarian pleasure-pain calculus. In aesthetics, as in metaphysics, the sheer pluralism that appears in lived experience gives us pause. The valued elements are there, and not just in private consciousness. Satisfactions arise in the semi- private, semi-public domain that is the organism-in-environment, and as such they have significance not only for the being that appre- hends them but also for the environment itself and for all those other beings that inhabit it. The diversity and tangibility of aesthetic values, though, must give rise to conflict as soon as more than one valuing organism inhabits an environment. 12 Thus arises the need for ethics, a systematic understanding of the relations that ought to obtain among various values, a theory of what is right. Based as it is on the view that value arises in a dynamic, infinitely complex system of organisms-in-environments, it is a basic tenet of pragmatic ethics that the rightness of an action is largely system-dependent. The Enlightenment dream of a universally valid ethical theory may appear plausible at first glance because many morally problematic situations do resemble one another so closely. The pragmatist, however, attends to difference and change as well as to similarity and constancy. As the world evolves, and as human thought and activities change along with it, new kinds of ethically problematic situations inevitably emerge. To cope, we need to develop new ways of comprehending what is right. No list of virtues, . no list of rights and duties, no table of laws, no account of the good should be expected to serve in every possible situation that we confront. Attempts to set down the "final word" on what is right have a disturbing tendency to show up as incomplete, ambiguous or quaintly archaic in the next generation. Pragmatism maintains that no set of ethical concepts can be the absolute foundation for evaluat- ing the rightness of our actions. We know from past experience that some ethical concepts work better than others in given situations, but our **past experience is the only thing we have as an ethical "foundation**." As Anthony Weston puts it, ethics is an endeavor more like creatively making our way through a swamp than it is like erecting a pyramid on a bedrock foundation. 13 After many trips through the swamp, we arrive at the means that serve best. Tomorrow we may have to readjust, though, because it is the nature both of swamps and of the world of values to shift continually beneath us. The aim of ethics is not perfect rightness, then, since there is no absolute standard for reference, but rather creative mediation of conflicting claims to value, aimed at making life on the planet relatively better than it is. At the social and political level, this perspective implies that the individual person is of inestimable importance**. All individuals are, prima facie, worthy of equal consideration**. Since it is impossible to comprehend any individual except in a context of relations, however, the individual is always to be seen as an integral part of many communities. Social, political and cultural institutions are there to provide for the needs of individuals. I have elsewhere put this point in terms of providing for the adequacy of life and, beyond this, for the significance of life. 14 That is, social arrangements need to be constantly re~evaluated and reconstructed to ensure that minimal requirements of the organisms-in-environment are met. Beyond this, growth ought to be encouraged. "Growth" here is not reducible to "material growth." To equate the two leads to unfortunate conclusions - for example, that per capita Gross Domestic Product measures well-being, which is ultimately a suicidal concept for a society to embrace. Growth might better be understood in terms of increasing the aesthetic richness of experience, of expanding the available means of finding satisfaction in life.15 Contrary to what the telecommunications industry tells us, this might well mean recycling one's television set rather than upgrading the cable service.

**We only need to win a 1% risk of existential threats to win**

**Bostrum**, **05** (Nick – professor of philosophy at Oxford and winner of the Gannon Award, Transcribed by Joe Packer 4:38-6:12 of the talk at http://www.ted.com/index.php/talks/view/id/44, accessed 10/20/07)

Now if we think about what just reducing the probability of human extinction by just one percentage point. Not very much. So that’s equivalent to 60 million lives saved, if we just count currently living people. The current generation. One percent of six billion people is equivalent to 60 million. So that’s a large number. If we were to take into account future generations that will never come into existence if we blow ourselves up then the figure becomes astronomical. If we could you know eventually colonize a chunk of the universe the virgo supercluster maybe it will take us a hundred million years to get there but if we go extinct we never will. Then even a one percentage point reduction in the extinction risk could be equivalent to this astronomical number 10 to the power of 32 so if you take into account future generations as much as our own every other moral imperative or philanthropic cause just becomes irrelevant. The only thing you should focus on would be to reduce existential risk, because even the tiniest decrease in existential risk would just **overwhelm any other benefit** you could hope to achieve. Even if you just look at the current people and ignore the potential that would be lost if we went extinct it should still be a high priority.

**Even a low probability outweighs**

**Art**, **03** (Robert – professor of IR at Brandeis University, A Grand Strategy for America, p. 212-213)

Fourth and finally, great-power wars are **highly destructive**, not only to the participants and their immediate neighbors, but also to world order and stability. Today, they may be low-probability events, but their **costs may be extremely high**. In this regard, we should treat Eurasian great-power wars the same way we do NBC terrorism, and the same way we treated the possibility of a general nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War: we should take multiple measures to prevent them and to limit them if they should break out. Great-power wars are potentially **too destructive not to do everything possible to avert them**; great-power peace should be over-determined, not left to chance.